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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
INFANTs-TORTS--WHETHER, AS A MATTER OF LAW, A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST A

FOR A NON-NEGLIGENT TORT MAY BE MAINTAINED IN ILLINOIS

MINOR Six YEARS OF AGE--A question of interest not only to the profession
but as well to the conscientious parents of infant children recently arose in
the Illinois case of Seaburg v. Williams.' Therein, a property owner sued
an infant six years of age for damages resulting from the burning of
the plaintiff's garage. In one of the four counts of the complaint, it
was alleged that the infant tortiously and wrongfully set the fire. 2 On the
defendant's motion, the trial judge dismissed the entire complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. With respect to the particular count in
question, the apparent reason therefor was that a minor of such tender
years lacked the mental capacity to commit an intentional tort. A judgment for the defendant was followed by an appeal to the Appellate Court
for the Second District of Illinois. That tribunal concluded that, as a
matter of law, it could not be said that a child of six lacked the mental
capacity to commit an intentional tort and, consequently, reversed and
remanded the case with respect to the aforementioned count.
Under the common law and according to the general rule in Illinois,
an infant is civilly liable for his torts.3 However, where there exists in
the particular case some element which is precluded by an infant's incapacity, he cannot be held liable for such tort.4 Thus, in the tort of
slander, an infant under the age of seven is deemed not liable as he is
presumed conclusively to be incapable of malice, a necessary ingredient of
slander.5 Another exception to the general rule of the tort liability of
infants appears in torts involving negligence. In negligent torts, an infant under seven years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable
of such conduct as will constitute negligence, for a child of such "tender
years" is deemed to lack sufficient mental development to foresee that his
heedless conduct might lead to injury.6
116 Ill. App. (2d) 295, 148 N. E. (2d) 49 (1958), noted in 19 Ohio St. L. Rev. 769.
2Two of the other three counts sounded in quasi-contract, while the remaining
count also charged the defendant with an intentional tort and further alleged that
he was protected by insurance. The ruling of the trial court was sustained with
respect to these three counts.
3 Palmer v. Miller, 380 Ill. 256, 43 N. E. (2d) 973 (1942) ; Mathews v. Cowan, 59
Ill. 341 (1871) ; Wilson v. Garrard, 59 Ill. 51 (1871) ; Ridenour v. Johns, 258 Ill.
App. 48 (1930).
4 In Crutchfield v. Meyer, 414 Ill. 210, 111 N. E. (2d) 142 (1953), and in Chicago
City Ry. Co. v. Touhy, 196 Ill. 410, 63 N. E. 997 (1902), it was held that an infant
under seven years of age was legally incapable of contributory negligence.
5 The court, in the instant case, referred to the fact that since, under the common law, an infant under the age of seven is not doli capaw, he is incapable of the
malice which is necessary for slander.
6 See cases cited in note 4, ante.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

The defendant in the instant case contended that, by necessary implication, the presumption of an infant's incapacity in negligence cases extends to the question of an infant's capacity for intent in cases of nonnegligent torts.7 In rejecting the defendant's contention, the appellate
court emphasized the importance of placing the burden of loss in "pure"
or intentional torts on the wrongdoer and compensating the innocent party
for his injuries, and held that whether the defendant could and did intend
to burn the plaintiff's garage was a question of fact. The reviewing court
clearly limited the question of the defendant's intent simply to whether
he had intended to do the act of burning the plaintiff's property. The
8
question of intent to cause harm thereby was held to be immaterial.
In the instant case, the distinction made by the court between the
mentality required in negligent torts and that required in wilful torts of
the trespass type does not appear to be strained. One can hardly question
the logic of a presumption that infants under the age of seven are without
sufficient mentality to foresee that their heedless conduct in the course
of their normal play might injure others. However, though prudence
and due care are not to be expected of infants of tender years, certainly it
can be expected of them that they are capable of intending to do their positive acts.9
In view of the law's solicitous attitude toward infants,' 0 the decision
in the instant case might appear to be an inconsistent regression. 1 ' However,
it seems nonetheless to have been a desirable decision. Recognition of
the destructive propensities of many infants and the lax parental supervision which could conceivably be an indirect result of decisions which are
unrealistically indifferent to the burdens which they place on innocent
persons injured by infants calls for just such a decision as that rendered.
It is not inconsistent to hold that the child who is incapable of negligence
7 To the effect that there is a rebuttable presumption of incapacity for contributory negligence in an infant between the ages of seven and fourteen years, see
Maskaliunas v. Chicago & W. I. R. Co., 318 Ill. 142, 149 N. E. 23 (1925).
8 In an Illinois case involving the burning of a barn by a defendant who was insane at the time of the act, the court held that "intent" was not a material consideration in torts of the trespass type, but apparenly meant that intent to do harm
was not material: McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N. E. 239 (1887). The court,
in the instant case, recognized that the tort liability of infants and of insane
persons is generally parallel.
9 Hutching v. Engel, 17 Wis. 230, 84 Am. Dec. 741 (1863). In that case, a boy
of six was held liable for trespassing upon the plaintiff's land and destroying the
flowers and shrubs thereon. It, too, holds that intent to commit harm is not material in cases sounding in trespass.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 591, declares that children under ten years
of age cannot be convicted of crime. See also notes 5 and 7, ante, regarding presumptions operating in favor of infants.
11 The note in 19 Ohio St. L. Rev. 769 so characterizes the decision in the instant
case as it expresses disapproval of the holding therein.
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is at the same time capable of intending to commit a positive act which
12
is wrongful in itself.
Although this case has not altered the rule of the non-liability of parents for the torts of their children, 13 it should, nevertheless, induce conscientious parents to make insurance provision for the protection of the
estates of their children as well for compensating the innocent victims of
14
intentional torts committed by their children.
J. F. QuErscH

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCF-MUTUALITY OF REMEDY-WHETHER A DECREE
FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE MAY ISSUE NOTWITHSTANDING A LACK OF MUTUALITY OF REMEDY AT THE INCEPTION OF A CONTRACT-The Supreme Court

of Illinois, through the medium of the case of Gould v. Stelter,' was recently faced with the problem of whether a contract might be specifically
enforced even though such a remedy would not have been available to both
parties at its inception. Therein, the plaintiff, acting under a power of
attorney, contracted to purchase a tract of land in her own name even
though authorized to contract only in her principal's name. When the

vendors refused to convey, the plaintiff filed a complaint for specific performance which, in the second count, sought a decree compelling the
vendors to execute a deed either to the plaintiff or to her principal. The
principal, nominally a defendant originally, then filed a cross-complaint
seeking identical relief. The trial court, dismissed both the second count
of the original complaint and the cross-complaint on the ground that
mutuality of remedy did not initially exist between the principal and the
defendants. In so doing, the court ignored the fact that the principal had
since ratified the contract and become bound thereon. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the decision and announced that the

technical requirement of mutuality of remedy at the inception of a con12 In the case under consideration, the court quoted from the opinion in Ellis v.
D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. (2d) 310 at 315, 253 P. (2d) 675 at 677 (1953), a case involving the legal sufficiency of a complaint charging a battery on the part of a fouryear old boy, as follows: "Thus as between a battery and negligent injury an infant
may have the capacity to intend the violent contact which is essential to the commission of battery when the same Infant would be incapable of realizing that his
heedless conduct might foreseeably lead to injury to another which is the essential
capacity of mind to create liability for negligence."
'3 White v. Seitz, 342 Ill. 266, 174 N. E. 371 (1931) ; Paulin v. Howser, 63 Ill. 312
(1872) ; Dick v. Swenson, 137 Ill. App. 68 (1907). A note on the subject of parental
responsibility for acts of juvenile delinquents appears in 34 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEw 222.
14 For further discussions of the tort liability of minors, see 1951 InI. L. Forum
227 and 23 Mich. L. Rev. 9 (1924).
114 Ill. (2d) 376, 152 N. E. (2d) 869 (1958).
Daily, C. J. filed a separate concurring opinion.

